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Abstract 
 
There has been much new research on the extent to which the identities, beliefs and practises of 
ordinary citizens changed after 1917, and whether people were ‘becoming Soviet’. This emphasis 
has tended to underplay continuities. This article uses the personal accounts of former nobles to 
examine levels of change and continuity in their activities and beliefs in the interwar period. 
There was change; many felt that they had ‘become Soviet’ because they obtained jobs, survived 
everyday challenges and endured the regime. Becoming ‘workers’, however, was not the same as 
‘becoming Soviet’. Strong continuities in other areas helped nobles to maintain a distinct identity 
in terms of practises and mentality (if not their material position). Rather than ‘becoming Soviet’, 
many former nobles tried to remain themselves. Many were surprisingly successful, suggesting 
that continuities played a significant role in early Soviet society. 
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One of the most fruitful areas of recent research into early Soviet history has been examining the 
issue of ‘becoming Soviet’ – how ordinary citizens reacted and related to the Soviet regime after 
1917. Kotkin noted that there were elements of belief and disbelief in all citizens, but it was 
frequently ‘naked self-interest and omnipresent coercion’ that encouraged people to ‘speak 
Bolshevik’, and governed their involvement with the regime.1 Fitzpatrick equated ‘becoming 
Soviet’ with self-preservation: people learned the new language and practises to survive and 
progress. They constructed new identities and backgrounds to conform to Soviet ideals and to 
conceal any unsavoury aspects of their pasts.
2
 Elsewhere, some historians emphasise resistance 
and dissent
3
, whilst others argue that many people were willing participants, engaging with the 
new ideology and actively desiring to refashion their lives and ‘souls’ to become socially 
valuable citizens.
4
 Valuable use has been made of new materials and approaches to breathe new 
life into what is essentially a long-running debate.
5
 
 This article, however, argues that this emphasis on how (and to what extent) identities, 
beliefs and practises changed after 1917 does not portray the whole picture: most obviously, it 
ignores continuities. Soviet citizens may have changed many aspects of their lives, but other parts 
remained unchanged or merely modified.
6
 Of course, continuities could arise from learning to 
‘speak Bolshevik’ superficially rather than truly believing, and from creating a new public ‘mask’ 
as opposed to a wholehearted transformation. They could also be a consequence of failing to 
adapt, despite attempts to do. Continuities were also part of the nature of the new regime, which 
increasingly adopted values and ‘norms’ that were heavily influenced by the past.7  
Nevertheless, an examination of one group on the margins of Soviet society – the former 
nobility – suggests that continuities ran deeper. Recent work has demonstrated that former 
nobles, along with other persecuted social groups, remained in the Soviet Union throughout this 
period, despite frequent arrests and imprisonment.
8
 To survive, all former nobles were forced to 
 4 
adapt to the workplace, altering certain beliefs and activities. Several noted later that in surviving 
they had ‘become Soviet’ and some quite clearly did. Antonina Berezhnaia (b. 1910) became an 
active member of the Communist Party, a ‘shock-worker’, and married a fellow worker. Her life 
had revolved around economic and social ‘accomplishments’ rather than personal gain; 
production targets, socially-useful labour and the sense of collectively working towards important 
goals.
9
 Other accounts, though, are less clear cut. Elena Skriabina (b. 1905) wrote that she and 
her siblings had become ‘sovietized’ by the mid-1920s. Skriabina called herself a ‘Soviet 
product’, whilst her mother remained an incarnation of the past, as evidenced by her disapproval 
of her brother’s new (non-noble) wife.10 Yet, Skriabina rejected one suitor for being uncouth and 
eventually married a former tsarist officer. For legality, they married in a registry office, but they 
confirmed the marriage in church. Kirill Golitsyn (1903-1990) also wrote that his generation was 
imbued with new Soviet ‘values’ by the mid-1920s. Yet, he lived and socialized with other 
nobles, and spent much of the decade in prison on account of his past.
11
 
This article uses the accounts of former nobles to examine levels of continuity and change 
in their activities and beliefs in the interwar period (or, to put it another way, it examines the 
extent to which they were ‘becoming Soviet’ during this period).12 Some clearly felt that they 
were ‘Soviet’ because they obtained jobs, survived everyday challenges and endured the regime, 
neither actively supporting nor resisting it. Becoming ‘workers’, however, was not the same as 
‘becoming Soviet’. Some nobles did not recognize this distinction, whilst others chose to ignore 
it. The regime expected individuals to refashion all aspects of their lives and mentalities. 
Consequently, the continuities that persisted in the everyday life of former nobles helped them to 
maintain a distinct identity in terms of practises and mentality (rather than material position), and 
at a time when doing so could incur fatal consequences. Personal accounts describe the lives of 
descendants of many famous noble families – Bobrinskois, Golitsyns, Sheremetevs, Trubetskois 
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and others – as well as numerous lesser nobles. They show that these individuals continued to 
intermarry and frequently socialized, lived and worked together. Many remained well-educated, 
participated actively in cultural activities and continued to go to church. None of this was 
welcomed by the regime as frequent arrests and imprisonments demonstrated. 
This argument does not suggest that nobles did not change. In the only work on former 
nobles, Chuikina argued that they continued to see themselves as ‘nobles’ prior to the Second 
World War. The persistence of traditional mentalities such as honour, service, duty and politeness 
helped them ‘endure’ the regime and remain distinct from it. These ‘attributes’ governed how 
they interacted with the regime.
13
 Her work focused on the labour market – an area of sizeable 
variety, change, and uncertainty, as she demonstrated. In trying to show how old skills and values 
fitted into the new world, Chuikina struggled with reconciling a static image of noble values with 
the fluctuating world of early Soviet Russia. Indeed, Smirnova accused Chuikina of ‘childlike 
naivety’ in this vision of a social group governed by notions of honour and ‘decency’.14 Nobles 
did retain some traditional mentalities, but they also did whatever was needed to survive. They 
falsified backgrounds, concealed their past and changed their views. This article, therefore, looks 
at how both elements – change and continuity – influenced former nobles during this period. 
Personal accounts are problematic sources in many respects: any evidence that relies on 
memory involves forgetfulness, suggestibility, hindsight, contradictions, dubious motives and the 
influence of collective memory.
15
 Memoirs are written to justify, apologise, excuse, or promote. 
They are as frequently read (and analysed) as literature as they are as sources of information.
16
 
Yet, as recent historians have reasserted, we cannot ignore these personal voices. It is too easy to 
assume, often without foundation, that somehow memoirists do not mean what they say or that 
their voice is false and misleading.
17
 They are no more misleading than contemporary documents 
that reflect voices constrained by the fears and concerns of the period. Moreover, subjectivity – 
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the capacity to think and act based upon a coherent sense of the ‘self’ – forms the value of these 
accounts.
18
 Most former nobles wrote autobiographies rather than memoirs. The former tend to 
look inward, focusing on the development of the self, whilst the latter concentrate on the public, 
on prominent events, individuals and actions.
19
 There are rarely clear boundaries between the two 
forms, but a greater focus on the self and how individuals changed over time is vital in answering 
whether nobles were ‘becoming Soviet’. Autobiographies also conduct a ‘second reading’ of 
experiences.
20
 This may lead to some activities being repudiated, but it also permits a broader 
evaluation of events within the wider context of the period and the authors’ lives.  
Personal accounts by émigré nobles focus on ‘invasion’ and defeat, describing intrusions 
into their private lives, their homes and, ultimately, their country.
21
 Nobles who remained in the 
Soviet Union, however, emphasise survival, in common with the vast majority of the massive 
wave of personal accounts that have emerged since glasnost in the late 1980s.
22
 All survivors 
were denied the opportunity to ‘bear witness’: arrests, disappearances, famine and other horrors 
became family secrets.
23
 Official history promoted achievements, marginalising sacrifices and 
violence. The emphasis since glasnost, therefore, has been to reinstate individual experiences into 
the history of Russia’s twentieth century. The desire ‘to tell their own story, a story of “I” as part 
of but also different from “we”’ motivates all memoirists.24 But this desire is particularly strong 
in Russia, especially for social groups that were completely erased, such as former nobles. They 
aim to rehabilitate themselves after seventy-four years of Communism so that their experiences 
are heard alongside those whose achievements were praised at the time. This desire is not always 
vindictive; indeed, most are more interested in describing their everyday lives than attacking the 
Soviet regime. In doing so, their accounts complement and extend other sources. They add the 
‘private’ to the ‘public’ that has been unearthed by recent archival research, whilst permitting 
former nobles to discuss what they feel was important. Oral interviews do add private detail, but 
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their content remains governed by the interviewers’ own preoccupations.25 There is much to be 
learned from assessing how former nobles portrayed and understood their own experiences.  
 
Revolution and Civil War, 1917-1921 
 
The Soviet state that emerged from the October Revolution of 1917 was a self-styled ‘proletarian 
state’ founded on the principle of class struggle and the hegemony of the working classes. The 
Bolsheviks attacked the nobility immediately after seizing power as the obvious example of an 
obsolete, exploitative and privileged group. On 11 November 1917, the nobility was abolished as 
a social estate, along with its organizations and its property. Decrees nationalizing land, industry 
and banks attacked noble landownership and finances. Nobles disappeared into a mass of ‘former 
people’ [byvshie liudi] – former bureaucrats, landowners, officers, industrialists and ‘bourgeois’ 
elements – who were attacked due to their privileged positions under the tsarist regime. Nobles 
recall frequent seizures of property, evictions and arrests throughout this period.   
In 1918, as a ‘non-toiling’ social group, nobles were amongst those denied the right to 
vote by the new constitution (a group known as lishentsy). In reality there was little worth voting 
for, but lishentsy suffered practical discrimination in everyday life; they were more likely to lose 
access to employment, housing, education and state aid (rations and medical benefits especially), 
and were forced to pay higher taxes and rates. They were arrested, imprisoned, exiled and 
subjected to forced labour. Further amendments to the constitution in 1924 and 1926 explicitly 
targeted not only those who were currently living from ‘hired labour’ or ‘unearned income’, but 
those who had done prior to the revolution to combat the fact that many former people had since 
been forced into ‘toiling’ occupations.26 Nobles only formed a small proportion of lishentsy, who 
in turn were only a minority of the whole population (1-10% at various times).
27
 Lishentsy could 
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appeal against being disenfranchised and thousands did, with many successes (25-50% of those 
appealing). Few former nobles appealed, however. Definitions of a kulak or trader were 
ambiguous and could be challenged; it was much harder to contest adverse social origins.
28
   
 Many of these problems were universal; all social groups struggled with housing, food 
and jobs during this period. But there is no doubt that nobles were more susceptible to arrest and 
imprisonment, especially as they had an ambiguous relationship to the new state. Many males 
fought against the Bolsheviks in the White Armies, whilst many others hoped that the regime 
would collapse sooner rather than later. The accounts reflect these sentiments; the immediate, 
short-term need to survive was matched with the expectation and hope that the Bolshevik regime 
would not last. Yet the regime, against all odds, continued to hang on to power and state-led 
repression further increased from the end of 1918. Increasingly nobles took advantage of the 
chaos to flee to areas held by the Whites or to escape abroad. These nobles never intended to 
build a life in Soviet Russia. Irina Elenevskaia (b. 1897) and other members of her family, for 
example, found jobs and shared a flat in Petrograd. The ‘whole purpose’ of their existence, 
though, was to escape to Finland as soon as possible and their life in the city was ‘simply a 
necessary evil.’29 She served on the housing committee, but only to facilitate selling her uncle’s 
furniture for money that could go towards the escape plans that were finally realised in 1920. 
This was the stereotypical picture of the nobility that has remained with historians: repressed by 
the new regime, the Whites defeated, nobles fled the country, forming a large part of the 
voluminous emigration that spread across Europe, America and the world.     
Many nobles, however, could not or did not want to leave their homeland. These nobles 
stress that they had to make a choice; they had to adapt to the new conditions and ideology or 
they would disappear into the dregs of society. Ekaterina Meshcherskaia (1904-1995) had 
enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle prior to 1917, but most of this, apart from some jewels, was lost 
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during the revolution. Her father was dead, her brother imprisoned, whilst she and her mother 
were left ‘dazed’ by events, living with friends, and distrusting and hating the new regime. Her 
mother, though, was determined not to be one of those ‘shameful’ and ‘repulsive’ nobles who 
resigned themselves to their fate, selling valuables on the black market, sinking into begging and 
destitution, whilst praying for the collapse of Bolshevik power. As the situation deteriorated in 
1918, her mother searched for a job. Initially there were no jobs for ‘princesses’, but eventually 
she became a cook in a water-works in Rublevo, near Moscow. As a child, Meshcherskaia noted 
that she found it harder to adapt initially, finding the poverty incomprehensible and the future 
bleak. Her mother was far too busy with the unusual manual work to waste time worrying. The 
situation slowly improved; the management realised that her mother was literate and moved her 
into a supervisory role, whilst Meshcherskaia, although young, was able to earn money as a piano 
teacher. After little more than a year, they returned to Moscow, the mother to sing and give 
singing lessons, whilst Meshcherskaia continued to teach music.
30
 
In the early 1920s, Meshcherskaia wrote that while she regretted the October Revolution 
as she had lost many family members, she welcomed the opportunities that it provided. She was 
no longer expected to follow noble traditions and simply become a good wife; she could now 
lead a more satisfying life. In her later memoirs, she argued that she and her mother ‘adapted’, 
even if forced by events; useful employment changed them and the way that others perceived 
them.
31
 Nevertheless, the overall impression is less clear cut. Their relationship with other social 
groups appears problematic, based as it was on a need to hide their privileged past. Equally, her 
mother’s transformation into a worker was clearly an unwilling one: ‘useful’ employment may 
have changed them, but the opportunity to return to Moscow was seized with both hands. The 
greater prominence posed dangers, but the work promised to be easier and more acceptable, 
drawing as it did on existing educational skills and cultural interests.  
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 Some nobles responded by gathering in family or kinship groups to pool resources as they 
tried to survive and adapt. In one unusual case, a ‘colony’ of extended family members gathered 
in Bogoroditsk (Tula province, south of Moscow) after the revolution. Lev Bobrinskoi (1878-
1922) and his family owned various estates around the town for centuries and were prominent 
local and national figures. They spent summer 1917, as usual, on their estate, but this time they 
also sought refuge from the revolutionary unrest in the main cities and stayed on into 1918 and 
beyond. Their experiences of the weak control of local Bolsheviks, alongside the plentiful supply 
of food, attracted numerous relatives to the estate. Bobrinskoi’s nephews, Kirill and Sergei 
Golitsyn (1909-89), and their families, lived in Petrograd and Moscow respectively after the 
October Revolution. Their fathers had found jobs (in an archive and a bank) to provide rations 
and money. But, as Bolshevik rule persisted and safety concerns came to the fore (Kirill’s father 
was periodically arrested in 1918-1919), they moved to Bogoroditsk. Sergei and his mother in the 
summer of 1918 (his father and grandparents followed later), whilst Kirill joined them in 1919. 
By then, seven Bobrinskois, eleven Golitsyns and six Trubetskois were in residence.
32
 
Bogoroditsk did provide security, although this diminished over time. Individuals 
obtained range of jobs with the rations and money earned helping to support the young and the 
old who could not work. A couple worked for local government in the health and land 
departments; several taught music, languages and other subjects in schools; whilst others found 
office-work.
33
 The impression gained was that the family was of great help; rations and payments 
often failed to materialise, forcing the ‘colony’ to barter to obtain food from peasants. Sometimes 
bartering was hard and unsuccessful; sometimes there was nothing to barter; and sometimes 
individuals fell ill, with typhus being rampant. Yet, there were always family members willing to 
help. The situation changed, of course: initially (summer 1918) servants remained, and milk and 
food were easily available.
34
 Towards the end of 1918, the Bolshevik threat grew steadily. 
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Attacks on the estate and the adjoining sugar factory grew in number, and the estate was searched 
with weapons confiscated and several arrested. Bobrinskoi’s twin brothers were shot separately in 
1920 and he died in a Bolshevik prison in 1922. Nevertheless, the ‘colony’ remained, staying in 
flats around the town in the early 1920s when they were forced from the estate. Similar examples 
can be seen elsewhere. A family ‘clan’ of between 20 and 35 people gathered on the estate of 
Vladimir Obolenskii (1869-1951) in the Crimea
35
, whilst smaller groupings were common. Vivid 
descriptions remain for those around the Osorgins in Kaluga and the Volkonskiis in Petrograd.
36
  
These communities provided a degree of stability and facilitated the continuance of old 
practises and traditions alongside new concerns and worries. In Bogoroditsk, the young continued 
to be educated, usually by other family members. Sergei learned French from his grandmother 
and was also taught by his aunt, going elsewhere for the rest of his lessons with three of his 
relatives. In addition, cultural interests were pursued with an intensity that suggested that they 
were an escape from everyday fears and a therapeutic link to the past. These nobles dominated 
local events: they organized plays, operettas, reading circles and art shows. It was done openly, 
involving local intelligentsia such as teachers and administrators, and available to the public. 
Occasionally they even made money. Culture was ‘ingrained’ in their lives: it kept the family 
together, preserved their identity and provided a breath of fresh air from everyday life.
37
 
As Sergei admitted, they benefited hugely from the benign attitude of local Bolsheviks. 
He noted that it was important to find a ‘tame’ [ruchnoi] Communist to provide protection and 
that this often worked prior to the mid-1930s.
38
 Relatively well-known examples during these 
years, especially for nobles with artistic or technical skills, were V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, L. B. 
Krasin, A. V. Lunacharksii, and the writer, Maxim Gorky. Gorky’s wife, E. P. Peshkova, was 
also active. She helped the Osorgins several times, repealing a death sentences and aiding the 
family’s emigration in 1931.39 Bribery could also pay dividends, especially locally, but even 
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leading Communists could only do so much. Meshcherskaia described F. E. Dzerzhinskii, head 
of the secret police, as a ‘protector’ after her mother had voluntarily handed in a valuable 
painting. Apparently, he helped them on several occasions, but he was unable or unwilling to 
prevent them from being dismissed from jobs and arrested.
40
 Active patronage, moreover, was 
different from simply appealing to leading figures when family members were arrested, which 
numerous nobles did. Ultimately, some nobles were helped, but the majority were not. By the 
1930s, any association with ‘former people’ was dangerous. A. S. Enukidze, secretary of the 
Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets, was specifically accused of helping 
former nobles and disenfranchised groups in 1935, leading to his downfall and death.
41
 
Throughout these early years, therefore, there was a great deal of change, but it rarely 
involved ‘becoming Soviet’. All Russians struggled to survive and the biggest changes arose 
from everyday life; the need to find employment, food and housing, all of which were rarely 
concerns for nobles prior to 1917. By persecuting former nobles for their ‘non-toiling’, 
‘exploiting’ background, the regime encouraged nobles to think that work was the main way to 
become accepted into the new society, particularly since opportunities existed. Nobles possessed 
valuable skills. Most spoke foreign languages, had experience of military or civil service, had an 
education ranging from law to sciences, and had cultural skills (music, dancing, riding and more) 
that new elites wanted to acquire.
42
 The Bolsheviks could not create a workers’ state overnight. 
Most workers and peasants remained illiterate, inexperienced or both. The regime needed skilled 
individuals to fulfil the demands of a rapidly expanding bureaucracy. In the 1920s, around 20% 
of bureaucrats and technical personnel across the state were elements from the old regime. In the 
People’s Commissariat of Agriculture, around 35% of its leadership in the 1920s had ‘noble’ 
backgrounds and many more were in lower level posts. It was not until 1928 that many were 
expelled.
43
 The military also desperately required experienced officers during the civil war and 
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thousands of ex-tsarist officers served into the 1920s.
44
 Furthermore, the Bolsheviks struggled to 
implement their policies effectively. Around 11-12% of landowners managed to retain a foothold 
on their former estates, even in their manor houses, into the mid-1920s. In 1925, a new campaign 
was launched to remove them; some, apparently, were still hiring labour and using excessive 
amounts of land. Thousands were expelled but up to 40% survived until collectivization at the 
end of the decade.
45
 Even then, nobles noted that they were forced from their estates as 
‘exploiters’, simply to find work in local government in the nearest towns.46 
Former nobles found work at all levels, from manual work to the highest military and 
scientific positions. Some nobles worked for the state because they actively supported its aims 
and objectives, whilst a few probably hoped to sabotage it from within. Others were careerists 
who recognized the opportunities for personal advancement in a fledgling state. More still, 
especially in the military, were quick to stress that they saw service in terms of serving their 
country, rather than the regime. Generally, nobles accepted the Soviet work ethic, however 
unwillingly. They saw the logic in the need to work and younger generations increasingly knew 
nothing else. And they were quick to promote themselves as ‘workers’. One former marshal of 
the nobility, protesting in 1918 about being classified as a bourgeois counter-revolutionary, 
argued that he was now a ‘worker’.47 Newly-working nobles resented being persecuted for their 
past, but the regime remained unwilling to accept that nobles could ‘become Soviet’: as the secret 
police stated in 1918 to Valentin Zubov (1885-1969), the Director of the Institute of the History 
of Art, ‘it is true that you work for us, but all the same you’re not really with us’.48 For former 
nobles, the regime itself was too unstable at this stage to make it seem possible or necessary to 
forge new, long-term identities, whilst the past was too immediate to be completely rejected. 
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The NEP Years, 1921-1928 
 
The important years, therefore, came after the end of the civil war in 1921. On the one hand, the 
regime’s permanency became evident as open opposition faded. All nobles remaining in Russia 
were forced to consider the longer term, even if they continued to believe in the regime’s 
eventual failure and downfall. On the other hand, to stabilise its position and aid Russia’s 
development, the regime promoted the New Economic Policy (NEP). This introduced some 
freedom (by partly reverting to capitalism) into the economy, alongside a relative relaxation in 
the repression and violence that had characterised the civil war years. The regime continued to 
target the nobility, along with other lishentsy and opposition groups, but initially at least the NEP 
seemed to provide greater opportunities. For Kirill Golitsyn, the NEP was the first ‘reasonable’ 
action of the government. It prompted widespread and sincere relief among nobles, as it became 
easier to obtain food and other goods. Older generations recalled a ‘blissful’ period between the 
revolutionary years and the growing repression of the late 1920s. Younger nobles saw it as 
chance to move forward, as it offered opportunities for education and better jobs.
49
 In Kirill’s 
case, it provided an opportunity to leave Bogoroditsk to search for more rewarding work 
elsewhere. He moved to Moscow in June 1920, training horses for the military with an uncle, and 
then to Petrograd and a job in the company controlling the railway to Murmansk. He held down 
various other jobs, before managing to enter into an architectural institute in Moscow.  
Other members of Bogoroditsk community also saw the NEP as the dawn of a new era. 
Sergei Golitsyn’s family moved back to Moscow in 1922, the year in which Sergei turned 13, 
hoping that he and his siblings could benefit from a better education in the capital. His siblings 
entered university and Sergei was enrolled at the school his sisters had attended before 1917. 
Restrictions on entry had been lifted to accept males, but many of the old teachers remained and 
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the education remained thorough. A rigorous interview process also remained. Although focused 
now on educational ability rather than social background, it undoubtedly removed less desirable 
elements of the population. Sergei was referred to as a burzhui [bourgeois] and suffered teasing, 
but he did not feel an outcast as other titled children also attended. In fact, only one boy in the 
class was from purely working-class parents. There were youth branches of the Communist Party 
(Pioneers for the younger children, Komsomol for the older ones), but primarily as vehicles for 
social activities and trips, such as one to Lenin’s mausoleum not long after it opened.50     
As lishentsy, higher levels of education were officially forbidden but, as elsewhere, 
policies were implemented haphazardly.
51
 Some nobles were refused access and a few émigrés 
from the early 1920s cite this as a reason for their departure. Petr Karpushko (b. 1900) moved to 
Petrograd in 1922 to study in an institute there, but was refused entry on account of his 
background. His only chance of further study seemed to lie in emigration.
52
 Others noted that ‘as 
a rule’ nobles were forbidden, before describing how they faced few problems.53 Some used 
personal connections, bribery or concealed their social origins.
54
 Lidiia Zemlianin (b.1914) was 
refused access to an institute in Moscow in 1930 (her father was an ex-tsarist officer and her step-
father was an engineer – a ‘bourgeois specialist’). After working for five years as a seamstress 
and attending night school, she was finally accepted into university as ‘worker’ and studied 
geology. There she met her future husband, also a noble, who had worked as a coal miner before 
using his ‘worker’ status to gain entrance. Berezhnaia, despite an active role in Komsomol, was 
still refused access to university in 1930. She worked in an arms factory in Tula, becoming a 
shock-worker and party activist, before gaining entrance in the mid 1930s.
55
  
Nobles recognized that education could be a means of advancement in Soviet Russia. This 
was reflected in the changing choices of subject matter. Prior to 1917, law was the most popular 
subject at university for nobles, although few became lawyers. By the 1920s, more nobles were 
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studying vocational subjects: Kirill Golitsyn gravitated towards architecture; Sergei Golitsyn 
towards accountancy; and Zemlianin to geology. The need to find jobs forced nobles to accept 
the vocational priorities of the regime. Nevertheless, older generations continued to stress 
traditional subjects to their children, even if they were forced to teach them in private. Young 
nobles studied music, ballet, dancing, literature, poetry, history and languages as before; Sergei 
Golitsyn was reading Jules Verne, Shakespeare and Walter Scott, as well as Russian classics.
56
 
Equally, nobles of all ages saw cultural activities as an essential part of life.
57
 They read Russian 
and European classics, and visited the theatre, ballet and opera whenever money allowed.  
Aspects of traditional culture were championed by the regime at various times, but noble 
activities went much further. Figes argued that émigrés had two different notions of Russia; the 
land itself, and its culture and language. Continued involvement in the latter helped nobles to live 
anyway and remain Russian.
58
 This feeling was shared by nobles within the Soviet Union. The 
government was alien to them, as was much of everyday life, but culture was a means to retain 
links to their past and their ‘Russia’. It also provided material support.59 The revolution destroyed 
old conventions preventing nobles from earning a profession from the arts. Iurii Olsuf’ev (1878-
1938) ignored his legal training after the revolution and spent the next twenty years working for 
various museums and workshops cataloguing, restoring and tracking down ancient paintings, 
writing numerous books on the subject. From 1934 until his final arrest in 1938 for spreading 
‘anti-soviet rumours’, he worked for the famous Tret’iakov gallery in Moscow.60 Some nobles 
taught literature, music or languages in schools or to the new elites, whilst younger nobles were 
free to enter the artistic world. They acted, sang, danced, wrote, painted and researched. These 
were challenging pursuits that provided some independence from the state, whilst preserving 
previous interests. Theatres, museums, universities and the Academy of Sciences became well 
known havens for former people during the 1920s and 1930s.
61
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Moreover, many nobles continued to live and socialize with other nobles. Vladimir 
Trubetskoi (1892-1937) lived in ‘aristocratic quarters’ in Sergiev Posad, alongside Goltisyns, 
Lopukhins, Naryshkins, Olsuf’evs, Raevskiis and other former noble families. His flat became a 
cultural centre – acting, music and story-telling. He contributed to journals, played the piano in a 
cinema and performed in a band in a restaurant.
62
 Kirill Golitsyn described how life buzzed with 
excitement before his arrest in 1923, with frequent parties, trips to the opera, concerts, theatres, 
restaurants and coffee shops. Indeed, only the lack of money curtailed their activities.
63
 Galina 
fon Mekk (1891-1985) wrote that the mid-1920s were the only years that she could call ‘in any 
way “happy”’ after 1917, positioned as they were between the sporadic arrests of her and her 
father (a railway specialist) that had persisted from 1918 to 1924, and her father’s final arrest and 
execution in 1928. She earned money from literary translations, whilst her circle of relations and 
friends met regularly to dance the foxtrot, discuss literature and perform plays.
64
 
All young people were enjoying life after the revolutionary turmoil. An official report 
estimated that around 71% of young workers in Leningrad liked dancing in 1929, with 46% 
frequently going to clubs and 11% even paying for lessons. Cafes and restaurants flourished, 
whilst western clothes, music and dances became fashionable.
65
 Significantly, though, nobles 
chose to socialize with other nobles. Sergei Golitsyn described an active social scene in the late 
1920s among former nobles in Moscow. Searches and arrests are overshadowed in his account by 
weekly social gatherings at each other’s flats. Sergei’s sister, Mariia, acquired a gramophone at 
this time and this formed the hub of their social life as they learned the foxtrot. He frequently 
visited the theatre, dressed up in dinner jackets and starched shirts for ‘balls’, and dined at 
restaurants when he could afford it. He also went on trips to visit friends in Iaroslavl’ and 
Vologda. By 1929, Golitsyn was living in a house with nine other nobles, including a former 
governor, marshal of the nobility and several former landowners.
66
 Sergei Raevskii (1907-2004) 
 18 
also described various entertainments, including ‘salons’ and a ‘masquerade ball’.67 There is little 
evidence to suggest any significant changes in the mentality or practises of these former nobles.  
This impression is reinforced by looking at continuities in religious belief. Despite its 
suppression by the regime, the church continued to be a significant part of the lives of many 
nobles. Families continued to gather as before at Christmas and particularly Easter. Some nobles 
refused to let their children go to school on traditional dates for church holidays after the calendar 
had been changed in 1918.
68
 Sergei Golitsyn’s family went to church every Sunday when in the 
provinces and this continued after they moved to Moscow in 1922. His uncle, M. M. Osorgin, 
worked to foster religious belief in his relatives’ children, ensuring that Sergei and others had a 
thorough knowledge of the old and new testaments. It succeeded. Church became part of the lives 
of these young nobles during the late 1920s. Sergei and others visited religious sites in a trip to 
the provinces north of Leningrad in an account that reads like a pilgrimage in his memoirs, but 
also served as a social event. During interrogations in the late 1920s, Sergei wrote that he was 
prepared to denounce the Tsar and declare his support for the regime, but he would not lie about 
his religious beliefs.
69
 Ol’ga Sheremeteva (1885-1941) continued to live in the Sheremetevs’ 
family palace in Moscow throughout this period, a stone’s throw from the Kremlin, earning a 
living from teaching languages, lecturing on historical and cultural subjects, and cataloguing in 
the State Museum of Literature. Her diaries portray an active religious scene. She joined marches 
protesting at the separation of church and state in 1918; she hoped for a revival of religion as 
congregations increased at the onset of the NEP in 1921; she mourned the death of the patriarch 
in 1925 in Donskoi Monastery with thousands of others; she and friends visited churches 
cataloguing and preserving icons in 1928; and Orthodox rituals played a vital role in coming to 
terms with the death of a close family member in 1935. Throughout, she visited the same 
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churches and saw the same priests, whilst chronicling, step-by-step, the state’s persecution of the 
church, from the destruction of buildings to the imprisonment of priests.
70
  
This commitment to a potentially dangerous activity was matched by Dmitrii Panin 
(1911-87). Growing up in Moscow in the 1920s within an intellectual family that mixed with 
educated and professional people, the Bolsheviks were seen as ‘godless’ people. Religion was 
one of the differences that he noted between those who fled Russia and those who remained; 
émigrés had church and culture, whilst he and his friends witnessed the destruction of religion, 
morality and order. Panin claimed that he stood up for his beliefs as he left school and the family 
to work in a cement factory from 1928 onwards. Other nobles, in his estimation, were more 
interested in university, marriage and a quiet life than standing up for their beliefs, however 
dangerous these were. Panin was a member of Komsomol because it was necessary to survive 
but, as he trained as an engineer in the 1930s, he consistently refused to join the party. His 
colleagues thought him young and naïve, but he equated religion to education, culture and 
progression. He was imprisoned in 1940, beginning a long sentence in the Gulag.
71
 
The 1920s were the years in which the examples cited at the beginning of this article – 
Berezhnaia, Skriabina and Kirill Golitsyn – believed that they were ‘becoming Soviet’, but the 
true picture was uncertain. The regime certainly continued to view them as inherently anti-Soviet 
and acted to marginalise them. Arrests remained frequent and widespread, whilst imprisonment 
and exile become more common as the 1920s progressed. Few nobles were willing to 
enthusiastically endorse the regime. Sergei Trubetskoi (1890-1949), active in anti-Bolshevik 
organizations during the civil war, noted vaguely in his interrogation in August 1922 that the 
persistence of the regime so far seemed to demonstrate that it was ‘a necessary phase’ in Russia’s 
historical development, but he was not a ‘prophet’ and had no idea what would happen in the 
future.
72
 By 1928, such non-committal responses were not enough to save nobles – even valuable 
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scientists, engineers and other specialists – as was demonstrated in the wide-ranging purge of 
‘specialists’ in that year.73 It proved fatal for many, such as fon Mekk’s father, as it spread across 
ministries, institutions and other technical organizations. Equally, throughout the 1920s, the 
regime also forced many former nobles to disappear into the anonymous mass of the population. 
Aleksei Bashkirov (1875-c.1937), for example, fled to his estate after the revolution with several 
family members. They were granted some land, but every year their position deteriorated. He 
remarried a peasant girl and remained in Russia when his daughters emigrated. He was forced to 
take odd jobs (wood cutting, local government work and others). A divorce followed and then, in 
1928, his house burned down, leaving him destitute by the time it was rebuilt. A mixture of 
unskilled rural and urban work continued into the 1930s, with Bashkirov barely making ends 
meet until he disappeared in 1937 with his brother (probably into the Gulag).
74
 
The regime, though, did not have to eliminate nobles to prevent them from becoming 
Soviet, simply ensuring instability was sufficient. Former nobles were forced from one job to 
another, shifting locations, frequently arrested and often exiled. Meshcherskaia spent the 1920s 
variously working as a music teacher, kindergarten teacher, textile worker, private language 
teacher, or was unemployed.
75
 Mariia Meiendorf (1869-1962) spent most of the 1920s giving 
private lessons in Odessa simply to be arrested and exiled in 1927. She moved to Ural’sk to join 
her cousins, obtaining a post teaching mathematics in a local school and gave private lessons to 
the son of a local police official. She remained after her exile had officially ended in 1931 but lost 
her job in a dispute over finances. She returned to the Odessa region, teaching German at a 
village school before returning to the city.
76
 Kirill Golitsyn’s studies in an architectural institute 
were short-lived as he was imprisoned from 1923 to 1928. He held a series of short-lived jobs in 
Moscow’s cultural world in the 1930s, married in 1931 and had two children, but was imprisoned 
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again in 1941 and unable to return to Moscow on his release in 1949.
77
 Even enthusiastic and 
loyal supporters, like Berezhnaia, were unable to initially enter higher education and other areas. 
Beyond calling themselves ‘workers’ in the 1920s, there is little sense that many of the 
nobles described above attempted to ‘become Soviet’ in any other way. They took advantage of 
the opportunities provided by the NEP to enjoy lifestyles that maintained many traditional 
elements. Above all else, these nobles continued to be associated with other nobles. They even 
gravitated towards each other in prison. During the revolution and civil war, it was easy to meet 
acquaintances in prison, but this was still possible in the 1920s. Kirill was imprisoned with his 
father in 1923 and became part of a noble ‘kolkhoz’ in cell 8 of the Butyrka prison in Moscow. 
They pooled resources and supported one another to survive. Georgii Osorgin (1893-1929) joined 
the cell on his imprisonment in 1925. At that time, twenty four people were involved, mostly 
relatives like Kirill, or friends and acquaintances.
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The Years of Terror, 1928-1941 
 
Although the attack on specialists in 1928 affected many nobles, the 1930s heralded a succession 
of more substantial threats. According to Meshcherskaia, 1933 was the darkest year yet due to 
new internal passports.
79
 There were already restrictions on movement, but in December 1932 
internal passports were introduced as further means of controlling the population. This policy was 
implemented throughout 1933. Initially affecting a few major cities, by the end of the 1930s it 
had spread to 37 cities and industrial centres, as well as frontier zones. Thousands were denied 
passports or fled to avoid applying for them; a sizeable proportion of the 3% denied in Moscow 
and as many as 10% in Kiev and Baku were former nobles.
80
 Meshcherskaia and others, 
including Meiendorf, were refused passports, imprisoned and forced to wait before reapplying.
81
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  A more serious threat emerged for former nobles in Leningrad with the murder of Sergei 
Kirov, the local Communist leader, in December 1934. This prompted widespread repression 
across the city from February 1935 onwards. This encompassed all groups but particularly 
targeted ‘former people’. Among the 4,833 ‘former people’ targeted as heads of families, were 
1,434 nobles (29.7%), including 67 princes, 44 counts and 106 barons, whilst over 11,000 
‘former people’ were targeted in total.82 Skriabina described a ‘purge’ in the government 
institution where she worked, which removed many with undesirable pasts. She escaped, but a 
former landowner was arrested and exiled from their communal flat. She felt the need to hang a 
picture of V. M. Molotov, the Soviet leader whose real name was Skriabin, on their wall to foster 
doubts about her family’s connections, even though Molotov was no relation. She wrote that by 
the end of these arrests the composition of the city changed, reflecting the arrests of friends and 
acquaintances.
83
 Most were exiled or imprisoned, but worse fates were possible. Raevskii and his 
wife were arrested in 1935 for ‘counter-revolutionary activities’ as the arrests spread to Moscow. 
Their ‘patron’, Gorky’s wife, Peshkova, could not help. He was incarcerated in a Gulag camp in 
North Siberia until 1939, living alongside an acquaintance, Aleksei Bobrinskoi, who was serving 
a ten year sentence. His wife was imprisoned in Moscow before being shot in 1937.
84
  
More than anything else, this purge illustrated how, by the 1930s, former nobles were 
dispersed across all levels of society and into all kinds of jobs. In Leningrad in 1935, Prince V. D. 
Volkonskii worked at a milk plant; Princess E. V. Gagarina was a secretary in a medical institute; 
Countess E. V. Tatishcheva was an instructor in ‘visual aids’; Prince M. D. Volkonskii painted 
houses; Princess M. A. Alferaka gave lessons in drawing; Baron V. N .Taube was a bookkeeper 
at a factory; Baroness V. V. Knorring-Formen was nurse; and Count A. S. Lanskoi was an 
unskilled factory worker. Almost all of them, according to reports, suffered material hardships.
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Moreover, these jobs were unlikely to have been their first. Across 1917-1941, the vast majority 
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of nobles changed their places of work several times and even their profession at least once. 
Many moved cities to try and utilize their skills, hobbies or personal connections to earn a 
living.
86
 Yet, despite this, they had been ‘discovered’ by the regime.  
Nevertheless, by the Great Terror in 1937-38, nobles were just one of numerous social 
groups, including the Communist leadership, who were affected. Indeed, the state recognized the 
changing nature of its search for enemies. Officially, the new constitution of 1936 stated that the 
regime had emerged victorious against class enemies and it restored the right to vote to everyone. 
Some nobles hoped that this constitution would prompt dramatic changes, but their hopes were 
largely ‘theoretical’87; there was a relaxation in rationing and restrictions on education, but terror 
quickly gathered pace elsewhere.
88
 This was inevitable – after all, the discussions over a new 
constitution began at the same time as the campaign against ‘former people’ in Leningrad. For 
nobles at least, state policies remained largely unchanged prior to 1941. Indeed, Sergei Golitsyn 
argued that whilst 1937 had the greatest impact on the whole country and upon historical 
memory, the years immediately after 1917 and even 1935 were worse for nobles.
89
 
Nonetheless, children of former nobles growing up in the 1930s continued to retain 
elements of nobles’ older identities. Lidiia Tolstaia (b.1921) had nothing but stories informing 
her of the past. Her father was Boris Tolstoi, a distant relative of the novelist. He obtained a job 
at the State Planning Commission in Moscow at the end of the civil war, his wife became a 
journalist, and her mother looked after Tolstaia and the household. Tolstaia enjoyed a happy 
childhood, but family stories made her aware of the trauma of the revolution. In addition, her life 
seemed to be dominated by the word ‘former’: ‘I used to hear the word former at every step. We 
got our bread at the former Filippov store, bought meat at the former Eliseev…Professor Ivanov, 
who lived in our house, was known as the former palace doctor…and Grandma was simply a 
“former person.” When was all of this and what had it been like? I often asked Grandma these 
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questions, and it turned out that it had all ended very recently – about ten or twelve years ago. 
And yet it was so unlike everything that surrounded me!’90 
Periodically, her mystical past came back to haunt her. The obvious example from her 
schooldays came in October 1932, when Tolstaia was refused entry into the Pioneers. One of the 
children’s parents had known her family when they had all lived in Baku during the civil war. 
Tolstaia’s parents were accused of mixing with intellectuals now condemned by the regime and, 
moreover, her grandmother spoke fluent French and had translated French poems. The latter was 
not such a problem – all knowledge could be used ‘in the service of the revolutionary class’, as 
one classmate grandly stated. But dubious acquaintances, few of whom Tolstaia actually knew, 
were a real problem. It was suggested that she could ‘disassociate’ herself from her parents’ 
‘incorrect actions’, but she would not. Tolstaia was ‘terribly ashamed’ and embarrassed, vowing 
never to return to school. Tolstaia’s family quickly found out. Her father refused to act, probably 
aware of the dangers of drawing attention to the family, whilst her mother was too busy. Her 
grandmother ended up resolving the dispute, ending up with a seat on the parents’ committee.91 
Tolstaia was proud to wear the red scarf of the Pioneers and stand with her classmates in 
celebrations marking the anniversary of the revolution and so on. As with Sergei Golitsyn in the 
1920s, these organizations were the nearest that children got to a social life in the 1930s. They 
were the only safe way of gathering and provided a range of educational and social opportunities. 
As befitted her youth, she did not connect these bodies, in which she mixed with her friends, with 
political events. Thus, in 1937, Tolstaia jumped at the chance to go to a Pioneer summer camp in 
the Crimea, where she saw the sea for the first time, and went hiking and kayaking. In the same 
year, her father was arrested in the purges because of his social origins, her mother was forced to 
leave her job in journalism, and the family’s material position worsened. In the autumn, this was 
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all pushed to one side in the excitement of starting new school term. In her account, Tolstaia 
seemed surprised by these memories of such a significant year.
92
  
Tolstaia’s account, therefore, reflects her ambiguous position. Her parents continued to 
stress old values; they considered that going to the theatre was ‘a necessary element of a proper 
education’, as were private ballet lessons, art school and an emersion in literature. She read 
Russian and European works in the late 1930s, from Pushkin, Bely and Akhmatova, to Dickens, 
Thackery and Stendahl.
93
 This was vital in raising a ‘well rounded human being’.94 To be sure, 
Pushkin was championed by the regime, which commemorated the centenary of his death with 
great fanfare, whilst Akhmatova retained popular appeal even if lacking official approval. But the 
extent of Tolstaia’s knowledge and interests went far beyond her classmates. Nikolai Kamenskii 
(b. 1923) described a similar position, albeit in Tiflis. He mixed with children of all backgrounds 
at school, but at home he read Fennimore Cooper and Jules Verne, learned French, listened to 
opera and classical music, and celebrated church holidays.
95
 At the same time, though, Tolstaia 
joined other young people in enthusiastically identifying with the idealism of Soviet propaganda. 
Industrialization was in full swing in the 1930s. Moscow was being rebuilt; churches and 
monasteries were replaced by building sites, whilst the metro system was taking shape. It 
heralded an exciting new world. According to Tolstaia, her friends devoured information about 
new hydroelectric dams on the Dnepr, new cities like Magnitogorsk, and five year plans – it all 
promised a very different future. Industrialization would eliminate all problems (from queues to 
repression), creating a better world. It was everyone’s duty to participate.96 
These contradictions were highlighted during the Second World War. Many former 
nobles fought in the Red Army, some volunteering and some being conscripted. Most fought for 
their country, not the regime. Kamenskii and his father both served, the former volunteering for 
the front in 1941 when 17 years old. They were serving the ‘fatherland’ as their ancestors had 
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done. Meshcherskaia wrote patriotic songs – ‘forward, to victory’ and ‘our banner’.97 Some had 
mixed experiences. Vladimir Trubetskoi’s son, Andrei (1920-2002), saw his father, elder sister, 
and other relatives perish in the terror of 1937. He was conscripted into the army in 1939 and was 
wounded not long after the USSR joined the war in 1941. Taken prison by the Germans, he was 
later released as they believed that a Russian prince was inherently anti-Soviet. He lived 
temporarily with relatives in Austria and Germany who had emigrated after 1917, but he spurned 
the opportunity to remain. He escaped, fighting his way back to Russia with the partisans in 
1944. It was his duty to serve Russia as his ancestors had done. Yet, as with other POWs, Andrei 
was regarded by the regime as ‘surrendering’ to the enemy. After refusing to become an informer 
for the KGB he was sentenced in 1949 to ten years in the Gulag. He was released in 1955 during 
the amnesties after Stalin’s death and went on to marry Elena Golitsyna (b.1924), the niece of 
Sergei Golitsyn, raise five children and complete a doctorate in biology.
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It is also worth noting that, almost forty years after the revolution, Andrei Trubetskoi 
married into another illustrious old noble family, the Golitsyns, thereby continuing centuries of 
links between the two families. Marriage patterns are difficult to quantify given the sporadic 
evidence. It has been argued that former nobles continued have higher expectations of potential 
marriage partners throughout this period; even if they were non-nobles, they tended to be well 
educated or artistically inclined.
99
 This argument, based on a handful of interviews, is difficult to 
substantiate, but of twenty or so nobles discussed in this piece who married during this period, 
over half married other nobles, whilst several married non-nobles and the rest are unknown. Most 
non-noble partners were well-educated or artistic figures.  
On the one hand, this seems surprising, as it would have been safer to marry lower social 
classes. There are, of course, examples of this happening; Berezhnaia married a worker, whilst 
Meshcherskaia entered into a sham marriage for protection in the 1930s.
100
 Mostly this arose 
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from the breaking down of social barriers – as was the case with Bashkirov – rather than a 
conscious desire to marry someone from a different background. On the other hand, given that 
many nobles lived, worked and socialized together, as noted above, it seems hardly surprising 
that a significant number also chose to marry each other. They shared common experiences and 
fears, and ultimately had the same beliefs and interests. Marriage helped to preserve these beliefs 
and to transfer them across generations, aiding continuity over change.  
Some nobles directly discussed marriage in their accounts. As noted earlier, Skriabina’s 
mother was not impressed by the social background of her son’s choice of bride in 1922 and the 
speed of the wedding. Skriabina claimed that such things were not an issue for her amid the 
realities of Soviet Russia, prompting her mother to accuse her of becoming ‘sovietized’. Yet, 
when it came to Skriabina’s own marriage, she rejected a potential suitor on account of his 
upbringing and manners. She eventually married a former tsarist officer at a Soviet registry 
office, before sealing the marriage in a church ceremony.
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 Kira Obolenskaia’s (b.1920) 
engagement to a former baron in 1937-38, then a composer, was welcomed wholeheartedly by 
her mother and grandmother, impressed by the groom’s lineage. Looking back, Obolenskaia 
recognized that it was wonderful for her mother, after a hard day’s work as a typist with people 
she would never have known prior to 1917, to spend an evening discussing cultural subjects in 
French, German, and English. Obolenskaia married young, not yet eighteen, but her family knew 
that they would struggle to find anyone as acceptable again.
102
 Many younger nobles also aspired 
towards getting married ‘properly’, and this included a suitable bride and church service.103 
Although lineage was a bonus, most former nobles were attracted to each other because 
they continued to value culture, education and manners above other concerns when searching for 
a marriage partner. Vladimir Trubetskoi highlighted this in letters written in 1934-35 to his 
nephew, Vladimir Golitsyn, from his place of exile in Andizhan, Uzbekistan. The key factor was 
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‘suitability’. He shared his nephew’s concern about the marriage of Sergei Golitsyn, providing an 
unfavourable description of the looks and speech of his non-noble bride. This was not explicitly 
class-orientated, but it reflected fears that different backgrounds and interests would harm the 
union. Trubetskoi valued ‘decency and honesty’, but such values were more common among 
certain social groups. He despaired of finding suitable partners for his own daughters in 
Andizhan. The local youth were ‘extremely vulgar, endlessly democratic, uncultured, and poorly 
educated. It will end with my having the type of son-in-law that would be a disgrace to display to 
any decent person.’ He noted that ‘there is not a single appropriate suitor’ in the whole city. He 
feared his daughters would therefore ‘naturally’ be enticed by some inappropriate ones.104  
Ultimately, a ‘good’ marriage was essential if former nobles were to retain a distinct 
identity. Vera Nilaev explicitly stated this, but her efforts ended in vain as many undoubtedly did. 
Losing the family house in Moscow after the revolution, she fled, with her four children, to the 
family’s dacha. Her husband having died, she worked hard to maintain the family, rearing 
chickens and rabbits in the dacha’s garden, and working at a local factory. Yet, escaping to the 
countryside backfired. Her three sons all ended up marrying illiterate rural girls. Although Nilaev 
recognized that they were good mothers, she saw the marriages as misalliances. As the family’s 
material position worsened, the marriages were another factor that made the younger generation 
indistinguishable from the village population (just as it did for Bashkirov, described above, when 
he married a peasant girl). Other blows came when one of her sons abandoned religion as two of 
his children died of illness, whilst another son succumbed to alcoholism. Nilaev’s worse fears 
had been realised; by the 1940s-1950s, the men were all factory workers and the women were all 
cooks or childminders. There was no sign of the family’s past.105 
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Conclusion 
 
This article aimed to analyse levels of continuity and change in the activities and beliefs of 
former nobles during this period to examine the extent to which they were ‘becoming Soviet’. In 
the end the picture remains mixed. Overall, their accounts largely conform to the standard 
narrative of the period: the violence of the civil war; relative thaw in the 1920s; renewed 
repression from 1928; the Great Terror of 1936-38; and the mixed motives for fighting in the 
Second World War. To be sure, various nobles usefully note that other dates (1918-1919 and 
1935, for example) were worse for certain social groups, whilst targeted sweeps of cities or 
districts made other dates memorable for some. But nobles were susceptible to arrest and 
imprisonment at all times. In response, former nobles changed in order to survive, as did all 
Russians in some way. Most obviously, nobles became workers. By the 1930s, most former 
nobles had held several jobs, often in more than one region of the USSR and in all areas of the 
labour market: government officials, officers, factory workers, teachers, scientists, painters, 
builders and so on. They also changed their living habits, sharing communal flats, eating 
whatever was available and struggling for money.  
Looking at these issues, Smirnova argued that former nobles were able to ‘integrate’ into 
Soviet society, but found the process complex and varied, whilst their social past was always a 
threat.
106
 But did this mean that they had ‘become Soviet’? Golitsyn and Skriabina believed so, 
whilst Meshcherskaia also highlighted work as the main element of change. Contemporary 
petitions suggest that nobles increasingly saw themselves as ‘workers’ once they had got a job. 
This, they believed, entitled them to acceptance in the new state. And in some respects, their 
arguments are justified given the regime’s emphasis on the duty of all Russians to work and to be 
productive citizens. In the state’s eyes, though, former nobles remained tainted by their social 
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past and the views that this past was supposed to foster. The state expected more; as well as being 
workers, it wanted Russians to reshape their beliefs and practises. Many nobles undoubtedly did, 
like Berezhnaia, but many others did not. These nobles, including Golitsyn and Skriabina, 
continued many traditional practises in terms of education, culture, religion and other elements. 
Some historians have argued that the regime undertook a ‘great retreat’ in the 1930s, embracing 
many of these elements itself as it restored the primacy of the family, traditional educational 
practises and so on.
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 This has been heavily debated and there is certainly no sense that the 
regime approved of the activities of nobles described above. Moreover, even in the late 1930s, 
many children of former nobles were growing up in a distinct environment from other children, 
even if their material position was the same or worse. 
There were, of course, differences within the examples discussed above. Older nobles 
were less dynamic than younger nobles. The focus in their accounts is strongly on survival, 
whereas younger nobles stress their desire to build ‘ordinary’ lives. The young are always better 
able to adapt; it was easier for them to find work and cope with everyday life. Moreover, those 
coming of age during the NEP were encouraged by the opportunities that it seemed to provide 
and were more likely to accept the permanency of the regime. Otherwise, though, the differences 
were less pronounced than might be expected. Older nobles continued social and cultural 
practises largely because they were ingrained, but increasingly many younger nobles adopted 
them as well. Equally, the experience of men and women are not as distinct as some have 
suggested. Oral evidence suggested that it was easier for women to adapt; they posed a smaller 
political threat, it was easier for them to retrain, and they could marry into new elites.
108
 The 
examples above do not support this to any great extent. Most female nobles also experienced 
imprisonment and exile during this period. Most struggled as much as men to adapt to jobs, given 
few of them had worked prior to 1917. Few showed any more inclination to marry lower social 
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classes than men. There may have been bigger distinctions between nobles living in the cities, 
especially Leningrad and Moscow, and those living in rural Russia. Bashkirov and Nilaev 
provide the only evidence of the latter here, but both suggest that it was harder for former nobles 
to retain a distinct identity in rural Russia. The elements stressed by nobles elsewhere – culture, 
education and social interaction – were hard to maintain in Russia’s vast countryside. 
Ultimately, nobles retained the strong division between the public and the private that 
many Russians did. Fitzpatrick has argued that all Russians reinvented themselves and their 
history to create a self (or a public mask) that could survive the dangers and take advantage of the 
opportunities as no-one was immune from the repression.
109
 Nobles agreed; as fon Mekk stated, 
everyone ‘lived a double life, wearing a mask when outside our homes, taking it off only when 
we knew that it was safe to do so.’110 In public, nobles became workers and refrained from 
opposition. Most did not believe in the regime, but it has been argued that many Russians 
inwardly rejected official values, even communists.
111
 In private, nobles carried on with their 
lives. There were changes, but there were also strong elements of the past. By the 1930s, 
elements of change and continuity had combined to create a distinct identity for younger nobles. 
Publicly, they could not be isolated from wider society and the country’s ambitions but, privately, 
strong influences at home succeeded in transmitting traditional values and practises. 
Many of these practises seem, in hindsight, to be risky, drawing unnecessary attention to 
former nobles at a time when this could prove fatal. Some, such as Panin, did see themselves as 
subverting the regime through their actions. Others would argue that one cannot suddenly stop 
believing in God, for example, especially given that they did not believe in Communism. 
Equally, Fitzpatrick has observed a certain ‘risk-taking’ mentality among all Russians. There was 
not as much caution as one would expect because there was little evidence that caution 
guaranteed survival.
112
 As the events of 1935 demonstrated, no matter where nobles worked, their 
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background continued to haunt them. Moreover, when even loyal communists were being 
arrested, there was little incentive for nobles to dramatically change. In their accounts, the state is 
an ever-present factor that cannot be controlled and contemporaries accepted explanations that 
historians distrust; namely, that survival was often down to chance and luck.  
In the end, though, certain practises and qualities were seen as being ‘noble’ and former 
nobles did not question continuing them. G. Kicheev (1906-78) did not enjoy the benefits of 
many of the former nobles described above. He lacked a good education and became a footballer 
and then a chauffeur. But, conscious of his roots, in the words of his son, he acquired 
‘aristocratic’ traits – that is, he educated himself, read foreign literature and historical works, and 
took up cultural pursuits such as music. Just as new Soviet elites had tried to acquire the ‘elite’ 
skills after 1917, Kicheev believed that noble attributes could be reclaimed.
113
 Rather than 
‘becoming Soviet’, many former nobles simply wanted to remain themselves. Many were 
surprisingly successful, suggesting that continuity played a significant role alongside change in 
early Soviet society.  
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